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8 Profiling of medical equipment risk using 
fuzzy logic 
Douglas Clarkson, Olhier Haas and Keith Burnham 
8.1 Introduction 
Models of risk generally struggle to cope with the complexities of healthcare, and in 
the context of medical equipment, it is apparent that several categories of 'risk' can 
be identified which are active concurrently. From previous development of a clinical 
risk simulation model within a Critical Care environment (Clarkson, 2009; Clarkson 
et al., 2009), a specific implementation of fuzzy logic was found to provide a means 
of developing a 'risk engine' which referenced contributing factors and preventive 
factors of risk in the clinical environment. Components of this 'risk engine' model 
have been applied to the task of classification of risk associated with medical 
equipment. This in turn allows priorities to be identified in relation to management 
of a diverse equipment portfolio. 
8.2 Identification of component risks 
A series of separately existing risks associated with the clinical use of equipment is 
identified as: 
a) unavailability risk 
b) measurement accuracy risk 
c) treatment accuracy risk 
d) diagnostic function risk 
e) intrinsic function risk 
These are identified as risks which can be managed/mitigated through implementa-
tion of appropriate policies for equipment management and maintenance. 
Unavailability risk is identified as arising out of non-availability of equipment 
before its intended use rather than failure or inappropriate function of the device 
during clinical use. This risk will be high where limited numbers of specialist 
equipment items are available to undertake potentially lifesaving clinical interven-
tions - such as defibrillators or ventilators. This risk will be modified by the extent 
of surplus/spare equipment available and the level of reliability of the equipment as 
reflected in the value of device failure rate. The failure rate of each device was 
derived from its maintenance history (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.5) via a specialised 
report using data from the Optim database and which calculated the failure rate of 
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all devices based on lifetime service history. This includes both 'accidental damage' 
and 'user error' components since both of these impact on equipment availability 
but excludes acceptance/commissioning and planned maintenance activity. A mean 
value of failure rate was derived for each equipment model. It would be a desirable 
feature of equipment management databases if the failure rate of devices could be a 
dynamically 'live' parameter for each inventory item and also for each model/brand. 
Measurement accuracy risk is introduced to focus on equipment which is essentially 
measuring parameters relat!ng to patient care. Specific examples include: 
a) Tonometers (ocular pressure) 
b) Blood Pressure (e.g. NIBP) 
c) Pulse Oximeters (oxygen saturation, etc.) 
d) Biometers (axial length, ophthalmology) 
e) Patient monitors (heart rate, etc.) 
This risk component assesses the potential clinical risk due to inaccuracy of 
measurements and can potentially highlight, for example, requirements for verification 
of device measurement accuracy within a planned maintenance programme and where 
test equipment has calibration traceability to national/international standards. 
Treatment accuracy risk relates to equipment items which are delivering energy or 
other agents to the patient. Specific examples include: 
a) Defibrillator 
b) Infusion device (syringe driver, volumetric pump, nutrition, etc.) 
c) Laser 
d) Ultraviolet treatment unit (e.g. whole body psoralen plus UV A 
(PUV A) treatment cabinet) 
e) Surgical diathermy 
f) Anaesthetic machine (e.g. flow rates, gas concentrations) 
g) Neonatal phototherapy 
This risk component assesses the potential clinical risk due to device inaccuracy in 
terms of the level of treatment delivered. Again, this analysis will assist in 
identification of equipment items which may require verification of treatment 
function during planned maintenance. 
Diagnostic function risk is introduced to focus on equipment which provides a 
degree of diagnostic function. Specific examples of 'complex' systems with 
diagnostic function include: 
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a) Defibrillator (e.g. identification of ventricular fibrillation (VF)) 
b) Arrhythmia analysis system (Holter system) 
c) Endoscopic ca mera systems (e.g. quality of image important) 
It has been identified that systems such as ophthalmoscopes, display screens, video 
processors, etc. have elements of diagnostic function since their performance 
influences clinical decision making. This risk component assesses the potential 
clinical risk in terms of accuracy level or quality of diagnostic function provided. 
All medical devices are identified as having an intrinsic risk through failure of the 
unit while in use on a patient. This potential risk of failure will be high for life 
support equipment such as ventilators and anaesthetic machines but low for devices 
such as nerve stimulators where there is no life support role. This intrinsic failure 
rate will be lower than the reported device failure rate since it will exclude accidental 
damage and operator error codes and is specifically associated with failure of the 
device while in clinical use. Some examples of ' intrinsic risk' failures are: 
• Operating table (collapse of support element with potential for patient 
injury) 
o Defibrillator (risk of failure of device to deliver treatment energy) 
o Failure of ventilator in Critical Care 
All devices are identified as having an intrinsic risk element, though this will vary in 
significance over the types of equipment in use. A specific model can therefore have as 
few as two risk factors (unavailability and intrinsic) identified or as many as five. There 
is, however, a subtle difference between the specific types of risk. The 'unavailability 
risk' and 'intrinsic risk' can be considered within a time period of a year of use of the 
equipment. The 'measurement', 'treatment' and 'diagnostic' risks are active on each 
occasion of use of the equipment and where, for example, each use of a blood gas 
machine can be identified with a fmite element of risk that parameter values may be 
inaccurate. The risk profile of a specific item of equipment will include a typical value 
for unavailability risk and intrinsic failure risk and can in addition include elements of 
risk associated with measurement, treatment and diagnosis and which can be summed 
over all uses of the equipment within a specific time interval. Within collaborative 
projects to collect and share data within equipment management databases, ' there 
should be a separate derivation/definition of unavailability risk and intrinsic failure rate. 
8.3 Application of fuzzy logic 
8.3.1 Two-parameter model 
The risk determinations required for medical device risk can be implemented using a 
simple fuzzy building block of 'two input-one output' , as indicated in Figure 8.1 
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Risk through 
device unavailability 
t 
Fza3 
. ~ ,. 
Unavailability Nominal device 
impact failure rate 
Figure 8.1 Model of 'risk of device unavailability' 
where input and output parameters range between 0 and 10. The function Fza3 is 
effectively a lookup table derived using fuzzy logic methodology where, for example, 
input value (3.4, 5.7) maps to a unique output value. 
Fuzzy logic is applied using basic building blocks of 'two input-one output' 
Mamdani fuzzy functions with five-level trapezoidal membership functions 
(Mamdani and Assilian, 1975). Such a framework has previously been described 
in relation to a system for simulation of clinical risk (Clarkson, 2009). 
The specific format of the fuzzy model utilised is that of a five-level trapezoidal 
function as indicated in Figure 8.2. This function allows a single parameter value to 
be represented by more than one function. For input value 'e' in the figure, 
intersection takes place at function 4 (high) at 'b' and also at function 5 (very high) 
at 'd' as an example of a function with two inputs and one output. 
8.3.2 Verbal reasoning assignments: Risk level 
A key element of the risk model is to match 'verbal reasoning' descriptions of 
parameters with corresponding numeric values. Table 8.1 indicates the descriptions 
of risk states as applied to all five risk categories as a function of output risk value . 
The 'key' value is described as the 'characteristic' value associated with the specific 
fuzzy function. Thus, the 'key' value of 3.33 is associated with the peak of function 
2 (Low). At this stage, the 'dynamic range' of the risk function is entirely 
determined by the user definitions within the application. This risk classification is 
very much 'response-based' , where the anticipated response to a specific risk value 
is identified. 
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Figure 8.2 Ident(fication of the specif1c component fitzzy functions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
lvhich relate to the sequence 'very low', 'low', 'intermediate', 'high' and 'very high', 
respectively 
A key aspect of the use of fuzzy logic in this application is the assignment of numeric 
values of input X and Y factors based on a linguistic reasoning assessment of the 
specific variable. The verbal reasoning elements are shown at specific single-value 
numeric values though the model allows for a continuum of values between 0 
and 10. 
8.3.3 Verbal reasoning assignment: Risk of unavailability 
Table 8.2 summarises details of verbal reasoning descriptions relating to risk of 
device unavailability. A classification of nominal device failure rate (FR) of number 
of failures per year is derived from the Optim database and used to derive an input 
'fuzzy' value to the fuzzy function as indicated in Table 8.3 and Figure 8.3. 
Constant values are assigned for failure rates <0.15 and >2.5 . 
8.3.4 Rule mapping: Risk unavailability 
After the X andY input components have been determined, it is necessary to derive 
the fuzzy rules which will map each X and Y input to a unique Z value. Table 8.4 
summarises the fuzzy function mapping. This contains the information to map from 
any value of X (Unavailability impact) and Y (Likelihood of device failure) to an 
output Z value (Risk unavailability). Thus, in the example of rule 10 (Table 8.4), for 
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Table 8.1 Mapping of linguistic description of risk to numeric output value of risk 
State Function Key Verbal reasoning element (risk level) 
number value 
Very Low 1 1.67 Very low level of risk, no action required 
Very Low - Low 2.5 Very low to low level of risk, no action 
required 
I 
Low I 2 . 3.33 Low level of risk, no action required 
·--
Low- 4.17 Low to intermediate level of risk, review 
Intermediate service history every 2 years 
Intermediate 3 5.0 Intermediate level of risk, but procedures 
should be reviewed annually to identify 
further actions to reduce risk level I 
--
Intermediate to 5.84 Intermediate to high level of risk, but 
High procedures should be reviewed annually 
to identify further actions to reduce risk 
level 
High 4 6.67 High level of risk - detailed risk analysis 
to be undertaken as soon as possible to 
identify origins with view to risk 
reduction 
High- Very 7.5 High to very high level of risk - detailed 
High risk analysis to be undertaken as soon as 
possible to identify origins with view to 
risk reduction. Consideration of urgent 
removal of equipment from clinical use 
pending review or implementation of risk 
reduction action 
Very High 5 8.33 Very high level of risk. Consideration 
I of immediate removal of equipment 
I from clinical use pending review or 
immediate implementation of risk 
reduction action 
Pro.flling of medical equipment risk using fuzzy logic 
Table 8.2 Unavailability impact: Key value and verbal reasoning description 
State Function Key Verbal reasoning description (criticality 
number value unavailability risk) 
Very Low 1 1.67 No impact on ability to carry out 
clinical activity 
Very Low - Low 2.5 Very slight impact on ability to carry 
out clinical activity which can be very 
readily managed 
Low 2 3.33 Slight impact on ability to carry out 
clinical activity which can typically be 
readily managed 
Low- 4.17 Slight to moderate impact which can be 
Intermediate expedited through borrowing of 
equipment from other areas or use of 
alternative methods 
Intermediate 3 5.0 Moderate impact on ability to carry out 
clinical activity, cancellation of clinics 
with delivery of less than optimal 
patient care but which is unlikely to 
affect patient outcome 
Intermediate- 5.84 Moderate impact on ability to carry out 
High clinical activity, cancellation of clinics 
with delivery of less than optimal 
patient care and which may affect 
patient outcome 
High 4 6.67 Significant impact on ability to carry 
out clinical activity, cancellation of 
clinics or theatre sessions or delivery of 
less than optimal patient care and 
which may affect patient outcome 
High-Very High 7.5 Significant impact on ability to carry 
out clinical activity, cancellation of 
clinics or theatre sessions or delivery of 
less than optimal patient care and 
which is likely ~to affect patient outcome 
Very High 5 8.33 Very significant impact on ability to 
carry out clinical activity with potential 
loss of patient 
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Table 8.3 Classification of risk in terms of fuzzy function 
Failure rate: I Percentage of Function 
representative Key Failure rate (FR): equipment items description 
value value range within range of failure rate values 
Very Low 0.15 1.67 FR ::s 0.15 68 
Low 0.3~5 3.33 0.5 ~ FR > 0.15 18 
Intermediate 0.875 5.0 1.25 ~ FR > 0.5 10 
High 1.875 6.67 2.5 > FR > 1.25 3 
- -
-
Very High 2.5 8.33 FR ~ 2.5 1 
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Figure 8. 3 Transfer jimction offailure rate to fuzzy function based on cubic 
polynomial fit 
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Table 8.4 Fuzzy function mapping for the two input and one output function 
Rule number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Unavailability 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 l 1 1 
impact 
'Modified' 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 
likelihood of 
device failure 
Risk of 5 5 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
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Figure 8. 4 Three-dimensional surface derived for risk of unavailability based on input 
parameters of unavailability impact and device failure rate 
a 'high' (function 4) level of 'Unavailability impact' and a 'very low' (function 1) 
level of 'Likelihood of device failure', the risk of unavailability is identified as 'low' 
(function 2). 
Calculations in MA TLAB® were then undertaken to determine output values of risk 
by incrementing inputs of X and Y between 0 and 10 with a step interval of 0.1 to 
essentially define a surface of function. The fuzzy calculations are essentially 
undertaken in one complete process to create a mapping profile as indicated in 
Figure 8.4. The fuzzy method can therefore be identified as a mechanism of 
structuring the surface of the interacting variables though other methodologies 
could also be used to derive such a surface. 
8.4 Active use risk: Measurement, treatment, diagnostic and intrinsic 
risks 
Figure 8.5 summarises the components of risk related to the 'active' use of the 
device on patients. 
The descriptions of criticality of specific 'active clinical use' elements relating to 
'measurement function', 'treatment function', 'diagnostic function' and 'intrinsic 
function' use a common set of descriptions as outlined in Table 8.5 and where the 
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Risk 1hrough level of 
accuracy of 
measurement 
OHicdity of 
measurement 
function 
level of device 
measurement 
accuracy 
Risk 1hrou9"1 
accuracy of 
dag1osic function 
Criiicality of 
dag1oslic 
function 
Level of device 
diagnos1ic 
performance 
Risk through level of 
accuracy in treatment 
CrHicality of 
treatment 
funciion 
Criticality of 
intrinsic 
function 
Risk throu9"1 
device 
failure 
Level of device 
treatment 
accuracy 
Level of device 
intrinsic 
reliability 
Figure 8.5 Summary qf' the components of risk (measurement, treatment, diagnostic 
and intrinsic) related to the 'active' use (~l the device on patients 
'criticality' factor relates to the specific risk factor, such as 'measurement' or 
'intrinsic'. 
Table 8.6 indicates details relating to risk of measurement inaccuracy - level of 
accuracy of measurement function. A similar structure operates for treatment risk. 
Table 8. 7 summarises the fuzzy function mapping to map from any value ,of X 
(Criticality of measurement function) andY (Level of accuracy of device function) 
to an output Z value (Risk due to measurement function inaccuracy). This translates 
into the fuzzy surface outlined in Figure 8.6. Similar functions are derived for 
treatment, diagnostic and intrinsic functions. 
Table 8.8 summarises details relating to level of accuracy of diagnostic function, and 
Table 8.9 summarises details relating to level of intrinsic function reliability. 
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Table 8.5 Details relating to criticality of 'active clinical use' elements of 
measurement, treatment, diagnosis and intrinsic risk 
I Function Key 
1 State 
number value Verbal reasoning element 
f---------
I No impact on patient status Very Low 1 1.67 
Very Low-Low 2.5 Very slight impact on patient status 
. which is reversible 
Low 2 3.33 Very slight impact on patient status 
which is reversible 
Low- 4.17 Slight impact on patient status but 
Intermediate harm is likely to be minor and 
reversible 
Intermediate 3 5.0 Moderate impact on patient status 
but harm is likely to be minor and 
reversible 
Intermediate- 5_84 Moderate impact on patient status 
High with chance that harm could be 
irreversible 
High 4 6.67 Significant impact on patient status 
with some likelihood of irreversible 
harm 
High-Very High 7.5 Very significant impact on patient 
status with high probability of 
irreversible harm 
Very High 5 8.33 Very significant impact on patient 
status which is likely to be irreversible 
and with potential loss of patient 
8.5 Results 
8.5.1 Deriving output risk values 
Details of coefficients are maintained in an Excel spreadsheet. Thus, each model is 
linked with up to 10 coefficients as indicated in Table 8.10. Analysis of risk is 
undertaken by review of all five potential risk contributions, though it is useful to 
identify one output as the maximmn value of all contributions and another as the 
maximum of all 'clinical' elements. This allows flexibility in analysis of an 
equipment risk profile. Figure 8.7 indicates the distribution of risk within risk 
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Table 8.6 Details relating to risk of measurement inaccuracy - level of accuracy of 
measurement function 
State Function Key Verbal reasoning element 
number value 
Very Low 1 1.67 Most measurement values are outside 
tolerance range, with some major 
deviations 
Very Low- 2.5 A significant number of measurement 
Low values are outside tolerance range, with 
some major deviations 
Low 2 3.33 Measurement values show significant 
variability, with some showing significant 
deviation 
Low- 2 4.17 Measurements show a wide variation of 
Intermediate values 
Intermediate 3 5.0 Measurement values are usually within the 
allowed tolerance range, but with some 
outlying points 
Intermediate- 5.84 Measurement values are usually within the 
High allowed tolerance range, but with the 
occasional outlying point 
High 4 6.67 Measurement values are consistently within 
the allowed tolerance range 
High- Very 7.5 Measurement values are consistently within 
High the allowed tolerance range and close to 
target values 
Very High 5 8.33 Measurement values are consistently within 
the allowed tolerance range, and with a 
close match to absolute accuracy values 
categories of unavailability risk and maximum clinical risk for a range of equipment 
models and where the elements (equipment models) are sorted in order of maximum 
risk (of unavailability risk). 
Figure 8.7 indicates the relative distribution of risk between these two risk criteria. 
The leading tail of high risk devices is the result of 'unavailability' risk triggered by 
relatively high failure rates of devices and implies mitigation of risk through a range 
of strategies which could include: 
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Table 8.7 Fuzzy function mapping for 'Risk due to measurement function inaccuracy' 
Rule 
number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Criticality of 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 
I measurement 
4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 
I , . i functiOn 
Level of 5 4 3 2 I 5 4 3 2 I 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 
accuracy of 
device 
function 
Risk due to 3 3 4 5 5 3 3 3 4 5 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 
measurement 
function 
inaccuracy 
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0 
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measurement 
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~· ... .. . 
0 
criticality of 
measurement 
Figure 8. 6 Risk associated Hdth measurement function inaccuracy 
• Provision of additional planned maintenance 
• Purchase of additional equipment 
• Review of user training 
• Replacement with more reliable equipment 
8.5.2 Application of the package: Risk classification high, medium and low 
The fuzzy logic risk tool is intended to be used as a mechanism to assist in the risk 
management of maintenance of medical devices referenced within its analysis. 
Table 8.11 identifies a generic classification of devices based on the perceived risk of 
devices and which is used to identify priorities within planned maintenance activity 
and also scheduled maintenance activity. The value of r of 5.84 corresponds to 
'intermediate to high' transition, and the value of r of 4.17 to 'low to intermediate' 
transition - as indicated within Figure 8.2. 
8.6 Discussion 
The fuzzy risk model is intended to be used as a risk tool for the risk management of 
maintenance of products referenced within its analysis. The risk levels determined 
are identified as triggers for review or intervention to manage/reduce the identified 
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Table 8.8 Details relating to level of accuracy of diagnostic function 
State Function Key Verbal reasoning element 
number value 
Very Low 1 1.67 Diagnostic function has a very low 
level of performance 
Very Low-Low 2.5 Diagnostic function has a very low to 
. low level of performance 
Low 2 3.33 Diagnostic function has a low level of 
performance 
Low-Intermediate 4.17 Diagnostic function has a low to 
intermediate level of performance 
Intermediate 3 5.0 Diagnostic function has a reasonable 
(intermediate) level of performance 
Intermediate-High 5.84 Diagnostic function has a reasonable 
to high level of performance 
High 4 6.67 Diagnostic function has a high level of ' 
performance 
High-Very High 7.5 Diagnostic function has a high to very 
high level of performance 
Very High 5 · 8.33 Diagnostic function has a very high 
level of performance I 
risk profiles and where different actions may be relevant for specific identified risks. 
High risk devices are typically managed by placing on pla1med preventive 
maintenance or on contract with external contractors. The quantification of risk 
in this context introduces a focus based on review of procedures to reduce the risk 
levels where they are identified as being too high. There are also impacts related to 
assessment of availability of equipment. 
The derivation of risk classifications is related to selecting specific break points 
which are related to the fuzzy functions, e.g. at 'low- medium' crossover and 
'medium- high' crossover as outlined in Table 8.11. This is considered to introduce a 
classification system consistent with the overall risk model and, in particular, with 
relative classification of 'high' risk devices. 
The risk model identifies that knowledge of the levels of accuracy of performance is 
required, specifically of medical equipment which provides a measurement and 
treatment f1mction . While this conclusion is entirely reasonable, it is also identified 
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Profiling of medical equipment risk using fuzzy logic 
Table 8.9 Details relating to level of intrinsic function reliability 
State Function 1 Key Verbal reasoning element 
number I value 
Very Low 1 1.67 Intrinsic device reliability is very low 
Very Low-Low 2.5 Intrinsic device reliability is very low to 
low 
Low 2 3.33 Intrinsic device reliability is low 
Low- 4.17 Intrinsic device reliability is low to 
Intermediate intermediate 
·---·---··- --····--· 
Intermediate 3 5.0 Intrinsic device reliability is intermediate 
Intermediate- 5.84 Intrinsic device reliability is intermediate 
High to high 
·- ·----·--------·---
High 4 6.67 Intrinsic device reliability is high 
High-Very I 7.5 Intrinsic device reliability is high to very High ! high 
Very High i 5 8.33 Intrinsic device reliability is very high I 
that this is not an area where a significant amount of data exists on which to base 
such risk assessments. 
While it is entirely possible to derive device failure rates within a single organisation, 
there is also value in establishing common criteria for determining such failure rates 
and comparing values between equipment maintenance organisations. This process 
would be especially relevant as part of equipment evaluation. This confirms the 
recoll1111endation outlined within Chapters 2 and 3 that improved device manage-
ment programmes would result from a sharing between departments of information 
such as device reliability. It is identified as important that the routine data from 
equipment maintenance databases is available to derive reliability information 
which can in turn be used within such risk models . Device failure rate is utilised 
within unavailability risk and can be extracted satisfactorily where planned service 
activity can be separated from breakdown maintenance. Data on intrinsic failure 
rates may be more difficult to identify but is an important factor to determine. This 
requires discipline within the context of data collection within the equipment 
management database and in particular of definition of failure codes as outlined in 
Chapter 2. 
The determination of various coefficients of the risk model requires a 'collective 
response' of experienced Biomedical Engineers and, where relevant, clinical users 
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Table 8.10 Details of coefficient file structure used to derive output risk parameter 
values and with indication of derived risk contributions 
r-- - -
Datex Baby log Ohmeda Specialised lab 200 Model (GE) equipment Alphamax 
transport Giraffe SLE 5000 
Omnibed incubator 
Equipment category . Infant Ventilator Operating Infant 
incubator table incubator 
Failure rate (annual 2.24 5. 15 2.75 3.96 
average) 
Criticality unavailability 7.5 7.07 7.07 7.07 
Criticality measurement 5.84 7.07 0 5.84 
Reliability measurement 7.5 7.07 0 7.5 
Criticality treatment 5.84 7.07 0 5.84 
Reliability treatment -T 7.5 7.07 0 7.5 
Criticality diagnosis 5.84 7.07 0 5.84 
Reliability diagnosis 7.5 7.07 0 7.5 
Criticality intrinsic 7.02 7.07 5.84 5.84 
(failure) I 
Reliability (intrinsic 7.5 7.07 7.07 7.5 
failure) 
... 
Unavailability risk 7.7277 7.2567 7.2567 7.2567 
Measurement risk 4.154 5 0 4.154 
Treatment risk 4.154 5.487 0 4.154 
Diagnostic risk 4.145 5 0 4.154 
Intrinsic (failure) risk 5.4647 5.4987 4.140 1 4.1401 
Maximum risk (all 7.7277 7.2567 7.2567 7.2567 
elements) 
M aximum risk (clinical) 5.4647 5.4987 4.1401 4.154 
Risk code HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
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200 400 600 800 1200 
element number 
Figure 8. 7 Distribution of risk tvithin risk categories of unavailability risk and 
maximum clinical risk for a range of equipment models and where the elements 
(equipment models) are sorted in order of maximum risk of device unavailability 
Table 8.11 Risk classification by estimated risk value 
I All maximum risk value criteria (r) Classification 
1 >5.84 High 
5.84~r~4.17 Medium 
<4.17 Low 
based on understanding of the function of the equipment and more importantly, its 
role and associated risk in patient care. It is proposed, however, to develop a software 
application where the coefficients determining the risk elements of the clinical risk 
elements (see Table 8.10) are derived from 'smart dialogue' relating to the device 
function and clinical application. While the initial set of determinations of risk 
parameters have been undertaken using MATLAB™ programming using previously 
computed arrays of functions Fza3, Fzm3, Fzt3, Fzd3 and Fzi3, an implementation 
would also be possible using an Excel spreadsheet with macro functions to compute 
risk parameters from failure rate data and identified risk coefficients. In te1ms of size 
of data set required to configure such risk evaluations, de.tails of 1000 models can be 
configured within an ExcelTM file of around 100 kbytes. 
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